A Vietnam War Reader by Michael H. Hunt

Author:Michael H. Hunt
Language: eng
Format: epub
Publisher: The University of North Carolina Press
Published: 2010-03-14T16:00:00+00:00

4.9 Ninth COSVN conference, resolution on a shift in strategy, early July 1969

While Vietnamization and negotiations unfolded, Communist Party leaders undertook their own strategic reappraisal. By April 1969 Hanoi was ready to concede that an immediate and total victory was beyond reach. PAVN and NLF forces had suffered more than a year of offensive action and heavy casualties. General Creighton Abrams, Westmoreland’s deputy, who took charge in mid-1968, had exploited their vulnerability to expand both territory and population under Saigon’s control. Hanoi’s new approach, intended to put the contest in the South on a basis that would be sustainable over the long term, envisioned more limited military action conducted on a more cautious basis with more attention given to the political dimensions of the resistance. As part of that shift, the NLF announced in June the creation of the Provisional Revolutionary Government as a formal rival to the Thieu government in Saigon. Although copies of the April discussions that led to this new approach are not available, we do have COSVN’s July circular, marked “absolutely secret,” which spells it out.

[The Americans] have been forced to de-escalate the war step by step and adopt the policy of de-Americanizing the war, beginning with the withdrawal of 25,000 U.S. troops, hoping to extricate themselves from their war of aggression in our country. This is the heaviest failure ever known in the U.S. imperialists’ history of aggression. …

However, … we have not yet produced any leaping development of decisive significance in our struggle against the enemy. Beside the big victories and strong points, we still have many weak points, shortcomings and difficulties. At present, the obstacles which most impede the progress of the General Offensive and Uprising in our war theater are: We have failed to promote a strong political high tide suitable to the requirements of the General Offensive and Uprising phase and the great political opportunity now prevailing; our military proselyting spearhead is still weak and has not taken full advantage of our great opportunity to accelerate the collapse of the puppet army and administration; guerrilla warfare has developed slowly and unevenly; our territorial forces at provincial and district levels, and even some units of our main forces at region level did not fight in good directions and according to good methods, and their combat efficiency is still low; the replenishment of forces, especially for units at region level and even for many provincial units, is still beset with prolonged difficulties; the building of political forces, especially Party Chapters, Youth Group Chapters and masses’ associations at the infrastructure level is making slow progress; the operations ensuring material support to the front lines are deficient and many areas still have difficulties [in getting supplies].

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